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Article text: 
 
The result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership will have significant 
implications for the country’s relationship with the rest of Europe and its own 
constitutional future, writes Kirsty Hughes. She argues that, whatever the outcome 
of the vote, the impact on the UK is likely to be substantial, long-term and broadly 
negative. 
 
At one level, the big question for the UK’s future relationship with the European 
Union is a simple one: will the UK’s citizens vote to remain in or to leave the EU in 
the upcoming referendum? Yet whichever way the vote goes, there will be 
potentially critical knock-on political impacts both for the UK’s own political future 
and for its role and influence in the EU. 
 
It is quite possible that England will vote differently to all three other constituent 
parts of the UK – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. And whether England drags 
the other parts of the UK out of the EU in a ‘Brexit’ against their will, or whether in 
contrast a reluctant England is kept in by the other three, political debates will 
erupt as a result. 
 
Current polls are only a rough guide, with the campaign yet to take off, but they do 
suggest the vote in England wavering between ‘stay’ or ‘go’, while voters in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland look strongly in favour of remaining in the EU and those in 
Wales also in favour, if less strongly so (see NatCen’s summary of recent polls). 
 
This suggests three main likely scenarios for the outcome of the referendum – a 
referendum that could be held as early as next June. In the first, the UK stays in, 
with all four constituent parts voting to remain. In the second scenario, the UK also 
votes to remain but with England outvoted in its desire to leave by Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. The opposite occurs in the third scenario, with the English 
desire to leave trumping pro-EU votes in the three other parts of the UK. 
 
While the possibility of Brexit leading to a second independence referendum in 
Scotland and so triggering the break-up of the UK has already been floated as one 
quite likely outcome of a ‘leave’ vote, this is only one of a number of likely impacts 
from the referendum – from a surge in English nationalism or an ever weaker and 
more marginalised UK staying in the EU, to a reluctant Scotland pulled out of the 
UK but without sufficient switch in opinion to go for a second independence 
referendum. The politics will not end with the EU referendum result. 
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Scenario One: A Clear Vote for the UK to Stay in the EU – But as a Low-Influence, 
Semi-Detached Member 
 
In this scenario, all four parts of the UK vote to remain in the European Union in a 
clear and non-divisive result. And while the Tory Eurosceptics are unlikely to give 
up their cause, this will surely deal with the issue of EU membership for a long time. 
There will be great relief in all EU member states and in Brussels, and especially in 
Ireland, where the impact of Brexit would be most strongly felt of all the other 
member states. 
 
Those in Scotland who hope a vote for Brexit to trigger a second independence 
referendum will be disappointed. But there are upsides for those supporting Scottish 
independence: it is much easier to envisage an independent Scotland if both 
Scotland and the rest of the UK are in the EU – borders, free movement, trade and 
even currency issues would be much harder if England was outside the EU and 
Scotland inside. 
 
There is one clear negative knock-on impact of the referendum in this scenario. The 
deal Cameron will have negotiated, combined with the referendum result, would 
reinforce the UK’s current semi-detached, low-influence role in the EU. Where in 
the past, the UK has been a strategic and high-influence player in Europe, this role 
has been thrown away in the last several years (principally by Cameron but to some 
extent starting with Gordon Brown). 
 
The referendum vote will not be on Cameron’s reforms but he would surely claim a 
majority ‘remain’ vote demonstrates support for the deal he brought home. And 
those reforms, such as the symbolic, but otherwise meaningless, demand for an 
opt-out from the goal of ‘ever closer union’, would reinforce the UK’s current role as 
a semi-detached member state focused only on trade and the Single Market, not a 
member state that is interested in the whole gamut of the EU’s policy and critical 
challenges – from relations with Ukraine and Russia, to the refugee crisis, 
terrorism, and social and employment issues. 
 
There is nothing to indicate that after the referendum Cameron, or any other 
Conservative Prime Minister will attempt to rebuild the influence and clout at the 
EU’s top tables that they have deliberately lost over the last five years. A future 
Labour government or progressive coalition could rebuild that influence, but any 
government that took a more positive, strategic and active role in the EU may find 
itself challenged by those who claim the referendum ‘remain’ vote was a vote for a 
disengaged, opted-out Britain in Europe. 
 
Scenario Two: The UK Votes to ‘Remain’ Despite an English Vote to ‘Leave’: 
Challenges Ahead for Scotland 
 
Current polls suggest that Scotland and Northern Ireland will vote strongly to stay 
in the EU, with Wales positive but less strongly in favour. NatCen, in its most recent 
analysis, put Scotland on 64 per cent, Northern Ireland on 75 per cent and Wales on 
55 per cent. If support is at these levels or higher on referendum day, the votes 
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from these three parts of the UK would counteract an English ‘leave’ vote up to 
levels of 51-52 per cent of voters in England voting for Brexit. 
 
Ironies will abound at this point. UKIP and other Eurosceptics may suddenly find 
themselves strong converts to a dissolution of the UK, and even unlikely proponents 
of an independent Scotland. Given England is the heartland of Tory Eurosceptics, 
and such a result will surely fuel their cause into the long term. The referendum will 
not, in any way, have calmed the permanent tensions over the EU in the 
Conservative Party. And new constitutional debates about the UK, driven by English 
nationalism, will spring up. 
 
A clear vote in England against the EU (say at a level of 52 per cent voting to leave) 
could mean any UK government in the years after the referendum would find it hard 
to play a highly active, strategic role in Europe, and would face much criticism from 
English sceptics, including in the media, if they did. This will cause little trouble to 
the current Tory government but any future Labour government may find itself 
hamstrung. The UK as a whole will be visibly divided on Europe – both across its 
four constituent parts, and with the ‘remain’ vote only just having won the day. 
 
There would also be implications for Scotland and any future push for independence 
after such a vote. Brussels and the EU’s 27 other member states would, for sure, be 
very grateful for the pro-European sentiments of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland keeping the UK in the EU. But there would then be a clear and ever present 
risk that, as and when Scotland holds a second independence referendum, this could 
trigger new demands in England for a second Brexit referendum. 
 
Without Scotland in the UK, a second EU referendum could easily translate into 
Brexit not long after. In this scenario, the scaremongering from Brussels about how 
long an independent Scotland would have to wait to join the EU would surely be 
heard again. Brussels and others would have a new reason to hope and wish that 
Scotland stays as part of the UK. 
 
Scenario Three: Brexit Goes Ahead and England Out-Votes Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland – UK in Crisis 
 
If England votes to leave the EU at a level of 53 per cent or more, then that would 
be very likely to outweigh the combined ‘remain’ votes of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. This is clearly the most politically explosive scenario – one that 
would have major ramifications for the UK, for the EU as a whole and for particular 
member states, especially Ireland. 
 
One major knock-on effect would be if Brexit triggers a second independence 
referendum in Scotland. In that case, Scotland could expect to hear much more 
positive mood music from Brussels and other member states about its case for 
independence and for becoming a full EU member state. 
 
While Spain’s concerns over encouraging Catalan independence would remain, the 
EU as a whole does not want to see member states leave – and so being a pole of 
attraction for an independent Scotland would, at that moment, be seen in a much 
more positive light. Scotland remaining in the EU would also be seen by some as 
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opening up a greater chance that at some point in the future England might 
reconsider its position and think about re-joining. 
 
The big question for the SNP and Nicola Sturgeon will be whether and how much 
support for Scottish independence increases in the face of a Brexit vote. Sturgeon 
has made the point that she wants to see clear and sustained support for 
independence before holding another vote – but if opinion shifts towards 
independence but not to the degree she would like to see (for instance, if support 
goes up to 54-55 per cent not 60 per cent) she will be under considerable pressure 
to hold a second independence referendum. 
 
The timing of a second independence referendum will be tricky. The UK Prime 
Minister (whoever it is at that point, Cameron surely having had to resign if the 
Brexit vote succeeds) may say Scotland should wait until the UK has negotiated its 
exit deal with Brussels. The SNP would need to be ready with a strong alternative 
strategy based on holding a rapid independence referendum ahead of Brexit talks. 
 
Then, if Scotland votes ‘yes’ to independence, three parallel sets of talks could be 
held at the same time – and overlapping issues dealt with across them. The three 
sets of talks would involve: the rest of the UK (rUK – ie excluding Scotland) and the 
EU on Brexit; rUK and Scotland on dissolving the UK; and Scotland and the EU on 
Scotland becoming a new member state. 
 
All of this would be highly complex. UK-EU talks on the UK’s exit from the Union 
would be highly likely to take several years (assuming the European Council agreed 
to extend the deadline set in the Lisbon Treaty of two years for such talks). But 
Scotland, having voted for independence, may be very reluctant to wait several 
years for its own new constitutional set up as an independent state to begin. 
 
It is also possible, in the face of a UK-wide Brexit vote, that opinion does not shift 
much in favour of Scottish independence. If there is little shift in the opinion polls, 
Sturgeon would be likely to hold back on demands for a new independence 
referendum. Scotland – along with Wales and Northern Ireland – would be taken 
out of the EU against its wishes. The political atmosphere in the UK at that point 
would surely be toxic with divisions and recrimination across the country. 
 
Relations with Ireland would also become very difficult with huge challenges in 
keeping the Common Travel Area open, if the UK stops free movement with other 
EU member states as a result of Brexit. 
 
Having voted for Brexit, the UK would then start tricky and time-consuming 
negotiations with Brussels on leaving the EU. And at home, there would be major 
debates about what sort of relationship the UK should have with the EU. The 
Scottish government would surely demand, but not necessarily get (given its 
relative lack of voice and influence in the UK’s EU policies today), a strong voice in 
those negotiations. 
 
One interesting possibility would arise at this point. Scotland (whether with or 
without Wales and Northern Ireland) could demand that a number of EU issues are 
devolved to the Scottish government and that it is empowered to develop closer 
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relations with the EU than the UK government negotiates for the rest of the UK. 
Thus, for example, Scotland might want to negotiate a differential relationship on 
education, research or agriculture. 
 
Whether this is possible, and whether Brussels would welcome it, is an open 
question. But in the face of Brexit, and in the case where support for independence 
does not increase strongly at that point, it is a possibility well worth exploring. The 
EU has a track record of creative solutions involving treating different parts of the 
same member state differently (think Cyprus, Denmark and Greenland, or the 
former East Germany reunifying with West Germany). 
 
The UK’s EU Relationship and its Constitutional Future After the Vote 
 
In the end, a vote for the UK to stay in the EU will, of course, create many fewer 
waves – in the UK, EU and around the world – than a vote to leave. But whichever 
way the vote goes, the referendum is likely to impact both on the UK’s future 
influence in, and strategy towards, the EU, and on its own internal politics. 
 
If all parts of the UK vote to stay in the EU, this would reinforce the UK’s current 
semi-detached, low-influence role in Brussels, and make it difficult for a future, 
more pro-European government to change that. 
 
If voters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland keep the UK in the EU, despite an 
English vote to leave, this will create a major debate amongst English nationalists 
and will surely not lead to the Eurosceptic cause dying down. And any future 
Scottish vote for independence would be highly likely to trigger a demand in 
England for a second EU referendum. 
 
If England votes to leave in such numbers that there is Brexit, against the wishes of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, this could trigger a second independence 
referendum in Scotland. And Scotland may at that point find Brussels much more 
positive about its chance of rapidly becoming an independent member state of the 
EU. But if Scottish opinion polls do not shift enough towards independence, the 
Scottish government may instead have to look for ways to keep Scotland more 
integrated than England with the EU, but from the outside. Relations between 
England and Scotland will certainly sour dramatically at that point. 
 
David Cameron called the EU referendum to deal with his own internal Conservative 
Party tensions over Europe. But whether he gets a ‘remain’ or a ‘leave’ vote, it is 
clear that the referendum will impact, mostly negatively, on the UK’s politics and its 
engagement with the EU for many years ahead. 
 
This article was originally published on openDemocracy. 
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